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1 Introduction
The role of the entrepreneur (EN) in modern economic societies has long been studied. Its rel-
evance is grounded on the belief that ENs are the ultimate engine of modern economic systems;
indeed, ENs are believed to be a signicant determinant of one countrys performance, particularly
with respect to innovation processes and job creation. Following Schumpeter (1911), a vast litera-
ture has studied the link between one countrys endowment of entrepreneurship and its ability to
achieve prosperity. Recently, Baumol (2004) has shown that most breakthrough inventions come
from independent inventors and ENs; large rms, instead, focus more on incremental (and often
invaluable) improvements.
Despite a vast interest in the eld, di¤erent authors have conveyed divergent messages about
both the entrepreneurial function and its characteristics. In fact, the study of entrepreneurship
lacks of consensus on the most crucial question: what makes an EN?
A recent theory developed by Lazear (2003) suggests that individuals mastering a balanced
set of talents across di¤erent elds, i.e. the Jacks-of-All-Trades (JATs), have a high probability
of becoming ENs. The crucial intuition rests on the idea that ENs di¤er from wages and salary
workers (WS) in that ENs do not need to be particularly good in one single skill; given that the
entrepreneurial function requires managing of di¤erent people and tasks, ENs must be su¢ ciently
well versed in a variety of elds. From this stems the comparative advantage for the JATs to choose
the entrepreneurial occupation.
In fact, cross-sectional evidence provided in Lazear (2003) and (2004) shows that measures
capturing an individuals breadth of experience across di¤erent elds positively a¤ect her probability
of becoming EN; this suggests that the JAT Attitude may be an important determinant of the
entrepreneurial choice. Similar evidence is provided in Wagner (2002) using German national
representative data. Finally, Baumol (2004) shows that a specialized education for mastery of
scientic knowledge can impede heterodox thinking, innovation and entrepreneurial spirit; this
provides general support for a JAT view of entrepreneurship. Yet, one question remains unanswered:
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is the Jack-of-All-Trades Attitude an innate ability or a skill that can be acquired?
In this paper, I investigate whether the JAT Attitude is an inborn and time-invariant individual
characteristic, driving educational and occupational choices, or an expertise that can be developed,
by training individualsknowledge across di¤erent elds, to increase their chances of becoming EN.
To shed light on this issue, I rst reconsider the theoretical JAT framework and discuss indi-
vidualshuman capital investment plans. Following Lazear (2004), I show that individuals who are
innately endowed with a high JAT Attitude and can easily master various tasks, have incentives
to train their knowledge across di¤erent elds, achieve a balanced skill-mix and become ENs.
This is important as it implies that inborn, and ultimately unobservable, attributes may drive
individualseducational and occupational choices. Cross-sectional estimates of the impact of knowl-
edge in a variety of elds on the chances of becoming EN cannot control for unobservable charac-
teristics: they are therefore uninformative when trying to identify the (causal) impact of acquiring
a wide set of skills on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.
To deal empirically with this problem, I exploit the longitudinal dimension of two Italian
datasets. First, the Bocconi University Graduates Dataset is explored; although information con-
tained in this database is well designed to test for the JAT hypothesis, the relevance of the results
may be reduced by the peculiar kind of sampled individuals. To overcome this problem, the JAT
hypothesis is confronted to information contained in ILFI Survey (Longitudinal Survey of Italian
Families) providing a meaningful picture of the whole Italian working population.
When cross-sectional techniques are used, I nd that the proposed JAT proxies, measuring an
individuals breadth of experience across di¤erent elds, are positively correlated with the entre-
preneurial choice; this conrms previous ndings. Yet, cross-sectional estimates are confounded by
unobservables driving self-selection into educational and occupational tracks.
In fact, when panel data techniques are used to control for unobservables, I nd that changes
in the spread of knowledge across di¤erent elds do not increase the probability of becoming an
entrepreneur. I interpret this as the true e¤ect of acquiring a more balanced skill distribution on
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individualsoccupational choices and conclude that most of the positive cross-sectional result is
driven by unobservables. This suggests that, if the JAT Attitude matters for entrepreneurship, it is
an innate and time-invariant individual ability, rather than a skill that can be acquired. Individuals
lacking of a JAT Attitude cannot be trained to become JATs.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reconsiders some aspects of Lazears theory. Sec-
tion 3 describes the two datasets. Section 4 assesses the empirical relevance of the JAT hypothesis
using multivariate regressions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Jack-of-All-Trades Theory of Entrepreneurship
2.1 Model Set-up
The model presented in this Section was rst formalized in Lazear (2003). The pivotal idea is that
ENs di¤er from wages and salary workers (WS) in that ENs do not have a comparative advantage
in one single skill, but master a more balanced set of talents across di¤erent elds. Since the
entrepreneurial function requires managing of di¤erent people and tasks, ENs must be su¢ ciently
well versed in a variety of subjects. From this assumption stems the comparative advantage for
individuals endowed with a balanced set of talents, i.e. the Jacks-of-All-Trades (JATs), to choose
the entrepreneurial occupation.
Let us start assuming that individuals are endowed with two inborn talents , x01 and x
0
2, and
ignore skill accumulation; the overall level of ability is X0 = x01 + x
0
2. Next, dene an indicator Ei
taking value one if individual i is EN and value zero if she is WS. Finally, consider two individuals,
i and j, characterized by the same X0; I dene the innate JAT Attitude (and characterize the
relation between the individuals) as follows:
Denition 1 For any X0, the innate JAT Attitude is dened by J0 =   x01   x02; x01   x02i <x01   x02j and X0i = X0j =) J0i > J0j .
Stated in words, the JAT Attitude is an entrepreneurial ability dened as an evenly spread
talent across di¤erent elds; the higher the JAT Attitude, the wider the set of tasks individuals
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can easily master. For equal levels of overall ability, if the talent distribution of individual i is more
balanced than that of individual j, then i is more Jack-of-All-Trades than j.
Following Lazear (2003), WS earn:
Y ws = max(x01; x
0
2) (1)
Since ENs must be good at doing many things, the JAT hypothesis can be captured writing
entrepreneurial revenues as:
Y EN = min(x01; x
0
2) (2)
where  can be interpreted as the market value of the entrepreneurial function.1
Who becomes EN? Individuals choose to be EN if and only if min(x01; x
0
2) > max(x
0
1; x
0
2),
which can be restated as:
8><>: x
0
2 > x
0
1= if x
0
1 > x
0
2
x02 < x
0
1 if x
0
1 < x
0
2
(3)
Assuming that g(x01; x
0
2) is the joint talent distribution on R
2
+, the probability of becoming an
EN, for a given , is :
Z 1
0
Z x01
x01=
g(x01; x
0
2)dx
0
2dx
0
1 (4)
which is increasing in the market value of entrepreneurship, . If  = 1, nobody is willing to
become an EN, while for  !1, all individuals choose to be EN;  is uniquely determined at the
equilibrium such that a su¢ cient number of workers choose to be EN.
The following implication can be derived:
1Following Lazear (2003), risk is ignored. Similarly, credit constraints, discussed in Blanchower and Oswald
(1991), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994), are neglected here. Notice, however,
that Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) provide evidence suggesting that individualscredit constraints exert a modest
impact on the transition to entrepreneurial occupations.
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Proposition 1 For any X0, J0i > J
0
j =) Pr(Ei = 1jX0) > Pr(Ej = 1jX0).
That is, ENs are Jacks-of-All-Trades: controlling for the overall level of ability, a more balanced
set of talents increases the probability of becoming EN.
2.2 Skill Investment
So far the distribution of talents has been taken as given. This is however an untenable assumption
as most individuals invest in skill acquisition before entering the labor market.
Following Lazear (2004), the basic JAT set-up is next extended to study the simultaneous
process of human capital accumulation and working decisions; this allows me to highlight the e¤ects
that di¤erent levels of J0 exert on individualseducational and occupational choices. Indeed, the
crucial question is: given the overall level of ability and the innate JAT Attitude, who has incentives
to acquire a balanced set of skills and become EN?
Let us start assuming that the cost function of skill production is:
C(x1; x2;x
0
1; x
0
2);
C1; C2 > 0 and Cii > 0
(5)
where C1 and C2 indicate partial derivatives w.r.t. x1 and x2, while Cii refers to second order
derivatives. It is assumed that x01 and x
0
2 do not exert any e¤ect on the shape of the curve:
higher endowments only reduce the overall cost of skill production. Moreover, it is assumed that
C1jx1=x01 < 1 and C2jx2=x02 < 1, so that individuals have incentives to invest in skill acquisition.2
Finally, let us denote by x1 and x2 the levels of skills emerging from individualshuman capital
investment plans and assume that individuals under discussion are initially endowed with more x01
than x02:
3
An individual who is going to work as a dependent worker will only invest in the talent she
is more endowed with. In fact, this is the skill upon which earnings in WS occupation depend;
2Lazear (2003) and (2004) deal with other possible cases; the intutions discussed in this Section are fully conrmed.
3All the argument follows with an inverted logic if x02 > x
0
1.
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there is instead no value to augmenting a skill that will not be used (x2). Essentially, would-be
employees have incentives to achieve a specialized skill distribution and consistently accumulate
human capital in one eld only.
ENs, instead, face a more involved problem. The constraint to their prots is the talent in
which they are weak, x2: there exist no incentives to invest in x1 unless x2 is brought up at least
to the level of x1. Human capital investment therefore initially concentrates on x2 and leads to a
more balanced skill distribution. As soon as x2 is taken up to the level of x1, the latter becomes the
new constraint to entrepreneurial prots; potential ENs would then benet from investing in x1 as
well, but the optimum must have x1 = x2. As long as the returns to the accumulation of expertise
in both elds are higher than the costs, would-be ENs invest in human capital by simultaneously
increasing their knowledge in both elds. In a nutshell, while would-be employees have incentives
to specialize, ENs pursue a balanced human capital investment strategy. The following Proposition
summarizes this intuition:
Proposition 2 Individuals who become entrepreneurs have balanced human capital investment
strategies and achieve evenly spread skill distributions.
But who has incentives to do so? Notice that individuals can choose whether to be ENs or WS
and how to invest in human capital when entering each sector; they base their decisions on the
expected revenues in the occupations. The optimal investment plan that maximizes revenues in the
entrepreneurial sector would lead all individuals to achieve the same skill distribution; in fact, for all
individuals, any additional unit of skill-balancing (or specialization) has the same marginal revenue.
Nevertheless, the cost of achieving an evenly spread distribution of skills is inversely related to the
innate JAT Attitude: the higher J0, the wider the set of tasks individuals can easily master, the
lower the e¤ort they have to exert to train their knowledge across di¤erent elds. Therefore, only
individuals with su¢ ciently high J0 nd it protable to invest in a balanced set of skills and become
ENs. This second intuition is summarized in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 3 Individuals characterized by a highly balanced set of innate talents have incentives
to acquire an evenly spread skill distribution.
In fact, the extended JAT set-up is not di¤erent from a standard schooling decision problem;
here, however, individualsinvestments concentrate on skill spread, rather than levels. Similarly,
individualsunobservable ability is replaced by the innate JAT Attitude (J0). The two Propositions
together have therefore an appealing intuition: more able individuals (high J0) have incentives to
train their knowledge across various elds, acquire a balanced set of skills and become ENs.
Notice nally that (especially from an empirical point of view) both the innate JAT Attitude
and the acquired breadth of expertise across di¤erent elds can exert distinct and positive e¤ects
on the probability of being EN. Once more, this is not di¤erent from what usually assumed when
studying the e¤ects of educational achievements on occupational choices: unobserved ability can
a¤ect the outcome both directly and indirectly, via educational achievements.
The next Sections exploit Italian workersinformation to test for the relevance of a JAT Attitude
on occupational choices.
3 Data
The empirical investigation in this paper is based on two datasets containing information about
Italian workers.
First, a dataset of Bocconi University students who graduated in 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997 is
used. Graduates were interviewed in 2001 and asked to report information about their working ex-
periences and familial characteristics. As for labor experiences, they were asked to answer questions
relating to the period just after graduation, rst job characteristics and current job situation. As
for familial background, individuals were asked to describe their current and past family situation
and answer questions about parental background. Individual data were then merged to Bocconi
Administrative Data to collect detailed information about university and high school curricula. A
job history panel was then obtained, where each individual has one row of data for each job she
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held.4
Although information contained in this database is well designed to test for the JAT hypothesis,
the relevance of the results may be reduced by the peculiar kind of sampled individuals. To over-
come this problem, the JAT hypothesis is also confronted to information contained in ILFI Survey
(Longitudinal Survey of Italian Families). While former Bocconi student may not be representa-
tive of a broad labor force, ILFI Survey provides a meaningful picture of the whole Italian working
population. In fact, this dataset was collected by a consortium of Italian Universities (ILFI (1997))
to provide an exhaustive description of labour market transitions and educational attainments of
Italian households through the analysis of individual and family life-histories. Indeed, a represen-
tative sample of Italian households was interviewed about social and demographic features of their
members; in addition, the whole life-history of each member of each family was reconstructed in
relation to education, training, work career and family characteristics. The dataset is organized as
a job history panel so that sampled people have one row of data for each experienced occupational
spell.5
Being an EN is at the heart of this empirical investigation. Both in the case of Bocconi and ILFI
data, I rely on self reported occupational information to determine entrepreneurial activities. For
Bocconi data, ENs are dened as non-dependent workers in one of the following categories: advisor,
entrepreneur, craftsman or managing partner of a society. Similarly, in ILFI Survey, ENs are dened
as individuals working either as self-employed, with or without employees, or as managing partners
of cooperative rms.
Given the scope of the analysis, it is crucial to distinguish true entrepreneurs from self-employed
who choose low-quality entrepreneurial occupations pushed by poor labor market alternatives. This
problem is certainly not binding for Bocconi Graduates, which su¤er from negligible unemployment
and out-of-labor force experiences. Yet, it may be relevant for individuals sampled by ILFI. To
4 I retain only employment spells. In the case of Bocconi Graduates, however, the incidence of unemployment and
out-of-labor force spells is negligible.
5Only employment spells are retained. Although this may introduce a selection bias, it seems to be a marginal
issue as only heads of households are sampled.
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overcome this problem, the analysis based on ILFI includes an extensive set of labor market controls;
moreover, alternative, more stringent, denitions of EN have been used to check the robustness of
the ndings. The problem of false entrepreneurs is thus empirically controlled for.
The main focus of this analysis is on the inuence that knowledge in a variety of elds, proxying
for the JAT Attitude, exerts on the probability of becoming an EN. Following Lazear (2003), the
next three variables are meant to capture the breadth of experience of sampled individuals:
 Specdi¤ : Dispersion of academic curriculum measured by the di¤erence between the max-
imum number of exams taken in one eld and the average number of exams across elds
(available for Bocconi Graduates).
 Grdi¤ : Dispersion of academic curriculum measured by the di¤erence between number of
exams taken in the highest average grade point eld and the lowest one (available for Bocconi
Graduates).
 Tot.N.Roles: Total number of roles held by the individual before the considered job spell;
notice that this is di¤erent from the total number of jobs (available for ILFI Survey).
To obtain the rst two indicators, Bocconi Administrative information about academic depart-
ment, research centres and research strands (within research centres) have been used to assign
exams taken by former Bocconi students to clearly dened elds; this allows me to create su¢ cient
variation among subjects taught in di¤erent areas. Importantly, although the structure of acad-
emic programs o¤ered to students is quite uniform during the rst two years, students have wide
possibilities to create their personal academic curricula in the remaining two years.
The total number of roles, instead, is derived from information about specic roles held by
individuals in each occupation, collected in IFLI Survey; roles covered by individuals can change
within the same occupation or remain the same across occupation. As long as there is su¢ cient
variation in the skill requirements across di¤erent roles, the total number of roles provides a good
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proxy for the breadth of expertise an individual has cumulated before the considered job spell.6
Additional controls will be included in the regressions discussed later on. Among the others,
information has been collected about individualsfamilial status and their family background.7
Descriptive statistics for the variables obtained using Bocconi data are reported in Table 1.
About 4600 employment spells have been sampled; entrepreneurial occupations represent around
8.5% of all observations. Notice that the interviewed individuals represent a young cohort of
workers; moreover, ENs fathers are more often involved in entrepreneurial occupations than for
WS. As for the JAT indicators, moving from large to small gures increases the balancing of skills
across di¤erent elds. Specdi¤ reveals that ENs have on average more balanced curricula than WS;
the opposite however is true for Grdi¤ .
Descriptive statistics for the variables obtained using ILFI Survey are presented in Tables 4.
The sampled workers are all heads of household aged between 18 and 60; additionally, the following
restrictions need to be satised for individuals to be sampled: i- they must have nished full time
education; ii- they must have been born later than 1936.8 The dataset counts about 5200 job spells
with entrepreneurial occupations representing 20% of the total. Only individualsinformation from
the second job spell onwards is presented. Indeed, the average job tenure cannot be properly dened
at the rst job spell; as I want to control for the average job tenure in the regression framework,
this is the relevant sample under analysis.9 As found by previous research in the eld, ENs tend to
be older and more frequently married. Descriptive statistics for the JAT proxy are also reported.
For both WS and ENs the total number of roles vary between 1 and 8; yet, ENs displays higher
mean values than WS, conveying the idea that they tend to be experienced in a wider variety of
elds.
6Notice that the validity of the three proposed proxies partly rests on a high degree of transferability of skills
across di¤erent jobs; in fact, this seems to be empirically plausible for both the considered datasets.
7No information about individualsnancial assets is available in the two datasets. Yet, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin
(2000) suggest that individualsnancial assets exert a modest e¤ect on the transition to entrepreneurial occupations.
Moreover, they show that the capital of parents exerts a large inuence, not through nancial means, but rather
through human capital. To control for this possibility we include in our analysis a wide set of controls for familial
background.
8This reduces recall bias problems.
9Results run over the entire sample, treating the rst tenure spell as zero, did not prove to be di¤erent.
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To sum up, descriptive statistics suggest that the JAT Attitude may be a relevant determinant of
the entrepreneurial choice of Italian workers. The next Sections assess the validity of this intuition
using a multivariate regression framework.
4 Regression Results
4.1 Econometric Framework
The empirical strategy followed in this Section builds on Lazear (2003): a dummy variable indicating
whether an individual is EN is modeled as a function of some underlying utility measures; in turn,
the utility is proxied by individuals characteristics and the dependent variable regressed on a set
of personal indicators.
Dene an indicator Eit taking value one if individual i is EN at time t (zero if she is WS). Also,
dene by BAit the acquired breadth of expertise across di¤erent elds, for individual i at time t, as
measured by the proxies discussed above; nally, denote by J0i individual is innate JAT Attitude.
Abstracting from other controls, the intuitions discussed in Section 2 can be represented as:10
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Eit = 1 + 2B
A
it + 3J
0
i + !it
with BAit = 1 + 2J
0
i + "it
and 2, 2 and 3 > 0
(6)
where "it and !it are idiosyncratic distrurbances with E("itjJ0i ) = 0 and E(!itjBAit ) = 0; the
signs of the coe¢ cients in (6) are those suggested in Section 2 and can be summarized as follows:
a higher innate JAT Attitude (J0i ) favors skill balancing (2 > 0); both the innate JAT Attitude
and the acquired level of skill-balancing exert positive e¤ects on the probability of being EN (2,
3 > 0).
In empirical applications, only BAit and Eit can be measured; the innate JAT Attitude (J
0
i ),
10A linear specication is assumed for the discussion of the analytical results. A linear probability specication
yeld consistent estimates of the parameters in the model. Moreover, it has the great advantage of providing a neeter
intution of the analytical results. Although the algebra is more convoluted, the main conclusions derived in this
Section apply to the non linear case as well.
13
instead, cannot be observed. It is, therefore, part of the regression error term if unobservables are
not controlled for.
Ignoring individualsunmeasured characteristics coincides with tting the following model:
Eit = 1 + 2B
A
it + it (7)
with it = 3J
0
i + "it. The expected value of (7) conditional on B
A
it is:
E(EitjBAit ) = 1 + 2BAit + 3E(J0i jBAit ) (8)
Now, consider that:
BAit = 1 + 2J
0
i + "it =) J0i = 1 + 2BAit + 'it (9)
with 1 =  12 and 2 = 12 . Whenever 2 6= 0, individuals self-select into educational tracks
and E(J0i jBAit ) = 1 + 2BAit 6= 0; cross-sectional techniques applied to (7) will give:
bEit = b1 + b2BAit (10)
where bEit represents tted values of Eit and b1 and b2 are biased estimates of 1and 2.
In particular, the bias of b2 is:
E(b2)  2 = 23 (11)
Given the focus of this research, the crucial parameter to be identied and estimated is precisely
2, as it measures the e¤ect of acquiring a balanced skill distribution (higher B
A
it ) on the chances
of becoming an EN. Yet, the JAT theory predicts both 3 and 2 to be positive: even when the
true impact of BAit on the probability of being EN is zero (2 = 0), its cross-sectional estimate can
be positive as a result of the bias induced by self-selection (23 > 0).
As long as J0i is a time-invariant individual attribute, the longitudinal dimension of the two
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databases can be used to control for unobservables and identify the (causal) impact of mastering
a wider set of skills on the probability of being EN (2). Only if, after controlling for unmeasured
individualsattributes, the estimated 2 is found to be positive and signicant, B
A
it can be said to
have a positive impact on the probability of being EN; the JAT Attitude can then be considered a
skill that can be acquired to gain access to the entrepreneurial function.
4.2 Bocconi University Graduates
Table 2 reports the rst set of results obtained using Bocconi data and tting cross-sectional
models that only control for individualsobservables; results obtained using linear, logit and probit
models are reported for two di¤erent specications. Columns 1, 2 and 3 replicate Lazears results
by only including individuals age, gender, number of entrepreneurship classes taken at university
and dummies for years of graduation. Columns 4, 5 and 6, instead, assess the robustness of the
results by adding an extensive set of controls. Regressions are augmented with dummies for number
of children and marital status at the time of the considered job spell. Also, some time-invariant
regressors are included: the nal high school and B.A. graduation marks, the grades at statistics
and mathematics and dummies controlling for the eld of specialization are appended to proxy for
individualsoverall ability and control for the fact that some courses are more specically designed
for given occupations. Finally, a dummy taking value one if individualsfathers were involved in an
entrepreneurial activity at the time of graduation and a counter for the total number of previously
held jobs are included in the regressions.
In all the Columns of Table 2 Specdi¤ enters with a negative and signicant coe¢ cient: a more
balanced curriculum, as implied by lower values of Specdi¤ , signicantly increases the probability
of becoming an EN. For the average individual in Column 1, moving from the least to the most
balanced academic curriculum, would increase the probability of becoming EN by about 7.5 p.p.;
given the sample frequency of EN, this would imply an increase in the probability of being an EN
of about 90%.11
11Notice that categories such as such as professionals and self-employed managing familial rms have been excluded
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Partly at odds with the JAT theory, Grdi¤ enters the rst three Columns of Table 2 with a
positive coe¢ cient. This is however a non robust feature of the data as this proxy turns insignicant
when more controls are added.
Results from the augmented regressions conrm previous ndings. The coe¢ cient on Specdi¤
is still signicant and larger than before. Moving from the least to the most balanced academic
curriculum would now imply more than doubling the probability of being EN. Importantly, the
JAT proxy remains signicant despite the variable Entrep.Father entering all regressions with a
signicant coe¢ cients: having an EN father increases the probability of becoming EN by about
5 p.p.. Irrespective of the relevance of the intergenerational transmission of the entrepreneurial
function, the JAT Attitude is found to be an important correlate of the entrepreneurial choice.
Results discussed so far suggest that the JAT Attitude is an important correlate of the entre-
preneurial choice. Yet, no causal interpretation has been given to the coe¢ cient attached to the
proxies for the breath of expertise as cross-sectional estimates may be distorted by individuals
unobservables. The longitudinal dimension of the dataset is here exploited to test for the relevance
of unobserved heterogeneity and identify the impact that a balanced set of mastered skills exerts
on the probability of being EN.
Panel data regression results are reported in Table 3. The estimated specication is reduced to
only include the following variables: individualsage, gender and familial status; the JAT proxies,
the number of entrepreneurship classes taken at university and the nal graduation mark; the
number of previously held jobs and the dummy for fathers entrepreneurial activity. The rst
Column reports cross-sectional estimates for the reduced specication showing that the operated
changes do not alter previous ndings. Yet, this compact specication is better designed to model
the longitudinal dimension of the data.
First, a Breush-Pagan test is performed to assess for the relevance of unobservables in the
from the denition of the dependent variable. The robustness of all the results has been tested by progressively
including omitted categories in the denition of EN. The results presented here are the most conservative about the
validity of the JAT hypothesis.
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estimated equation; the test strongly rejects the null of no unobserved heterogeneity. The parameter
3 of system (6) is therefore statistically di¤erent from zero.
Next, a Hausman test for a random e¤ect estimation of the proposed specication is carried out;
random e¤ects estimates reproduce very closely previous ndings.12 Yet, the Hausman statistics
strongly rejects the null that random e¤ect estimates are consistent; this rules out the assumption
of no correlation between observables and individualsunmeasured characteristics. The coe¢ cient
2 in system (6) cannot be assumed to be zero and a xed e¤ect specication must be adopted.13
As both available JAT proxies are time-invariant individualsattributes, standard xed e¤ect
techniques cannot be used as they would partial out the variables of interest. To overcome this
problem, Amemyia and MaCurdy (1986) procedure is adopted; the idea behind their strategy is
based on a renement of the original Hausman and Taylor (1981) approach.14 Regressors are
ideally split: in time-xed vs time varying regressors; and endogenous vs exogenous regressors.
An endogenous regressors is dened as a variable whose correlation with the unobservable xed
e¤ects cannot be assumed to be zero; on the other hand, exogenous variables are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the error term. The intuitive condition for identication in Haumsan and Taylor
(1981) states that the number of time-varying exogenous regressors should be greater than the
number time-xed endogenous variables; the mean (and deviations from mean) of the exogenous
regressors can then be used to instrument the endogenous ones.
To obtain an estimate of the impact of Specdi¤ on the probability of being EN, I consider
the following regressors as uncorrelated with individualsunobserved e¤ects: age, gender, marital
status, number of children and number of entrepreneurship classes taken at university. A Hausman
test for the validity of the instruments was performed: the test strongly speaks in favor of the
12Notice also a reduction in the sample size; this is due to the fact that some individuals do not change job over their
life. Previous results are fully conrmed if we conne our attention to individuals changing job over the considered
time spell.
13Unfortnatuely, neither the sign of 2 nor that of 3 can be determined without making additional assumptions
on the structure of the econometric model.
14Only linear model estimation results are presented. In fact, Amemyia and McCurdy (1986) procedure cannot be
easily extended to non linear models.
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instrument choice (p-value .99).15
Estimation results (Column 4) reveal that, although the coe¢ cient attached to Specdi¤ is larger
than before, it is now completely statistically insignicant. This suggests that, when the e¤ects of
unobservables are purged out of the estimates, the acquired spread of knowledge across di¤erent
elds does not have any signicant impact on the probability of being EN.
Notice also the negative and insignicant coe¢ cient attached to the dummy for fathers en-
trepreneurial activities: compared to cross-sectional results, this suggests that all the variable is
capturing is some unmeasured transfer of capital occurring across generations. This may take the
form of physical capital (plants or credit availability) as well as human capital (rm specic skills
or entrepreneurial networks).16
To conclude, the analysis conducted using Bocconi data suggests that, despite positive cross-
sectional ndings, acquiring a balanced set of skills does not have a positive and signicant impact
on individualschances of becoming EN. Using Bocconi student data, yet, it may be di¢ cult to
draw inferences for more heterogeneous populations. To overcome this problem, the JAT hypothesis
is next confronted to information contained in ILFI Survey.
4.3 ILFI Survey
Table 5 presents cross-sectional regression results obtained using information contained in ILFI
Survey. Columns 1, 2 and 3 replicates Lazears results by modelling the entrepreneurial choice as
a function of educational dummies, age, gender, average job tenure, Italian nationality and the
number of previously held roles (proxy for the JAT Attitude). Respectively, they report OLS, logit
and probit estimates.
The positive and signicant coe¢ cients on the variable counting the number of previously
held roles conrm the results obtained using Bocconi data: the JAT Attitude has a remarkable
15The test is based on a comparison between xed e¤ect and Amemyia-MaCurdy coe¢ cients; given the reduced
number of commonly estimated parameters, the power of the test is limited. Other specications were tried; neither
testing nor estimation results proved to be di¤erent.
16This evidence is well in line with what discussed in Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000).
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explanatory power for the probability of being EN. In all regressions, the proposed JAT proxy
enters with a sizable coe¢ cient. Its marginal e¤ect on the probability of being an EN is around
2.5 p.p.; similarly, OLS regressions imply that one additional role held in the past increases the
probability of becoming an EN by 2.7 p.p.. This compares with an average probability of being an
EN of about 20% implying that an additional held role increases the probability of being EN by
15%.
Following Lazear (2003), the average job tenure is included as a control. Holding the number of
roles constant, moving from rm to rm decreases the probability of being EN. This is at odds with
a risk preference interpretation of the entrepreneurial choice; yet, as suggested by Lazear (2003), it
may also be that the average tenure is capturing some ability to focus on projects, which increases
the probability of becoming EN.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 scrutinize the robustness of these ndings by including a series of additional
controls. First, a battery of dummies is included to clean out regional and sectoral di¤erences, as
well as the e¤ects of fathers educational attainments. Some family background information is
also included; rst, a dummy taking value one for married individuals is included along with the
number of children still living in the house. Next, I control for the number of siblings living with
the individual when she was fourteen and for whether she is still living with her original family
at the time of the reported employment spell. Both these variables should capture the possibility
that transfers within the family occur altering the probability of being EN. Finally, a variable for
previous unemployment spells and a dummy taking value one if individuals father was an EN when
she was fourteen are included.
Results from this set of regressions conrms previous ndings. The e¤ect of the JAT proxy
is positive and signicant with a marginal e¤ect of about 2 p.p.; similarly, OLS coe¢ cient is as
large as 2.5 p.p.. Importantly, the coe¢ cient on the dummy for fathersentrepreneurial activity is
large, positive and signicant: its marginal e¤ect is as sizable as 5-6 p.p.. Despite the relevance
of the intergenerational persistence in occupations, the JAT Attitude is found to be an important
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correlate of the entrepreneurial choice.17
Finally, notice that, in all regressions, previous unemployment experiences exert a negative,
non-signicant e¤ect on the probability of becoming EN; this helps excluding the possibility that
the observed entrepreneurial spells are last resort occupational choices, motivated by individuals
poor labor market opportunities.
As discussed above, cross-sectional results can only suggest that the JAT Attitude is an impor-
tant correlate of entrepreneurship; yet, these estimates cannot help discriminating whether the JAT
Attitude is an innate ability or a skill that can be acquired by training knowledge across di¤erent
elds. As long as the innate JAT Attitude can be treated as a xed unobservable characteristic,
the longitudinal dimension of the dataset can be exploited to control for unobservables and obtain
a consistent estimate of the parameter of interest (2).
Panel regressions results are presented in Table 6. Columns 1 and 3 present results for lin-
ear panel xed e¤ect estimation while Column 2 and 4 report results from Chamberlains (1984)
conditional logit model.18 Before commenting on the ndings, two remarks are worth been made.19
First, a Breush-Pagan test was performed on the linear specications to test for the signicance
of unobservables. In both cases, the null of no unobserved heterogeneity was strongly rejected. The
parameter 3 cannot therefore be assumed to zero.
Next, a Hausman test was performed on the linear regressions. For both specications, the test
strongly rejects the consistency of random e¤ect estimators: the correlation between unobservables
and regressors is thus far from being null and 2 in (6) cannot be considered statistically zero.20
17 In all the analysis conducted so far, self-employed workers of family rms were excluded from the denition of
EN. The robustness of the presented results was assessed by including in the denition of the dependent variable
the omitted category; no changes in either the magnitude or the signicance of the coe¢ cients of interest could be
detected.
18Linear xed e¤ect and conditional logit models are natural panel counterparts of linear and logit cross-sectional
models, when a random e¤ect specication cannot be assumed. No such a counterpart exists for probit specication,
as probit xed e¤ect models are plagued by the incidental parameter problem.
19The reduction in the sample size is due to the fact that some individuals do not change job over their life. The
sample is further reduced when performing a conditional logit, as this requires individuals to change their occupational
status. Previous results are fully conrmed if we conne our attention to individuals changing job over the considered
time spell.
20 In principle, the sign of 2 cannot be determined without additional assumptions on the econometric model.
Nevertheless, a regression of the total number of roles on the estimated individual xed e¤ects displayed a strong,
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If the sign predictions developed in Section 2 are correct, cross-sectional estimates obtained
before can be expected to be positively biased.
The four Columns of Table 6 conrm this intuition. Once unobservables are purged out of
the regressions, it is found that mastering a wider set of skills does not increase the probability of
being an EN. Indeed, in Columns 1 and 3, the coe¢ cient attached to the JAT proxy is negative,
although insignicant. More surprisingly, the e¤ect of having covered a larger number of roles
becomes signicant and negative when Chamberlains methodology is used.
The negative result strikingly clashes with previous ndings, where the impact of the JAT
Attitude was as high as 2.5 p.p.. This suggests that self-selection may be completely driving
cross-sectional results with no real e¤ects of BAit on the probability of being an EN.
To conclude, the JAT Attitude, as proxied by the total number of previously held roles, is an
important correlate of the entrepreneurial choice. However, the JAT should only be considered as
an innate and time-invariant entrepreneurial ability, driving educational and occupational choices.
The causal impact of acquiring a wide set of skills on the probability of being EN is found to be
either non signicant or negative. There is thus little scope in trying to develop a JAT Attitude to
increase the chances of accessing the entrepreneurial function: individuals lacking of a JAT Attitude
cannot be trained to become JATs.
5 Conclusions
Despite the crucial role played by ENs in modern economic societies, the study of entrepreneurship
su¤ers from the lack of consensus on the most crucial question: what makes an EN? A recent
theory developed by Lazear (2003) suggests that individuals mastering a balanced set of talents
across di¤erent elds, the Jacks-of-All-Trades (JATs), have a high probability of becoming ENs.
In this paper, Lazears original set-up has been revised to investigate whether the JAT Attitude
is just an innate and time-invariant entrepreneurial ability or a skill that can be acquired to gain
positive and signicant coe¢ cient. This is suggestive of 2 being positive: a high innate JAT Attitude calls for
further skill balancing.
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access to the entrepreneurial function.
First, the theoretical framework has been reconsidered to account for individualsunobservables
and investment in human capital. Following Lazear (2004), it has been shown that the higher the
innate JAT Attitude, the stronger the rationale to further balance the ability-mix and become EN.
This is important as it implies that cross-sectional estimates of the impact of knowledge in a
variety of elds on the chances of becoming EN may be confounded by unobservable characteristics;
they are therefore potentially uninformative when trying to identify the causal e¤ect of acquiring
a wide set of skills on the entrepreneurial choice.
Information contained in two Italian longitudinal datasets has then been exploited to explore
whether the JAT Attitude is an expertise that can be developed.
Cross-sectional results show that the proposed JAT proxies, measuring individualsbreadth of
experience across di¤erent elds, are positively correlated with the entrepreneurial choice.
Yet, a di¤erent picture emerges when panel data techniques are used to control for individuals
unobserved attributes. The estimated impact of knowledge in a variety of elds on the probability
of being EN is found to be either non signicant or negative. This suggests that the JAT Attitude is
an innate and time-invariant individual ability, rather than a skill that can be acquired. Individuals
lacking of a JAT Attitude cannot be trained to become JATs.
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6 Description of the Variables
6.1 Bocconi University Graduates
The following variables have been constructed for the Bocconi University Graduate Dataset:
 Entrepreneur : dummy=1 if, in a given job spell, an individual reports to be non-dependent
worker in one of the following categories: advisor, entrepreneur, craftsman or a managing
partner of a society.
 Age: individuals age at a given employment spell.
 Female: dummy=1 if the individual is female.
 Married : dummy=1 if the individual is married at a given employment spell.
 N.Children: total number of children at a given employment spell; the following dummies
have been generated: No children, One child, Two children, Three or more children.
 High Sch.Grade: High School graduation mark.
 B.A.Grade: B.A. graduation mark.
 Maths Grade: average grade at mathematics exams taken at university.
 Stats Grade: average grade at statistics exams taken at university.
 Grdi¤ : JAT Attitude proxy; see body text.
 Specdi¤ : JAT Attitude proxy; see body text.
 N. Entrep.Classes: number of entrepreneurial classes attended at university.
 Entrep.Father : father declared to be an entrepreneur (same denition as for Entrepreneur)
when individual graduated.
 Total N.Jobs: number of previously held jobs.
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6.2 ILFI Survey
The following variables have been constructed for the ILFI Survey:
 Entrepreneur : dummy=1 if, in a given job spell, the individual reports to be self employed
with or without partners or to work as a managing partner of a cooperative society.
 Age: individuals age at a given employment spell.
 Female: dummy=1 if the individual is female.
 Married : dummy=1 if the individual is married at a given employment spell.
 N.Children: total number of children at a given employment spell.
 Italian: dummy=1 if the individual is Italian.
 Out Orig.Family : dummy=1 if the individual is not living with his/her original family.
 Entrep.Father : dummy= 1 if father declared to be an entrepreneur (same denition as for
Entrepreneur) when individual was fourteen.
 High Edu.Level : highest educational level obtained. The following dummies have been gen-
erated: No schooling degree, Primary School, Secondary school, High school, University,
Post-graduate degree.
 N.Siblings: number of siblings living at home when the individual was 14 year-old.
 N.Years Unempl.: total number of years of unemployment at a given employment spell.
 Av.Job Tenure: average job tenure.
 Tot.N.Roles: JAT Attitude proxy; see body text.
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Table 1: Bocconi University Graduates, Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean St.-Dev. Min Max
Worker Age 4164 28.7 4.21 22 45
Female 4256 0.34 0.47 0 1
Married 4256 0.26 0.44 0 1
High Sch.Grade 4239 51.8 6.93 36 60
B.A. Grade 4256 102.6 6.91 80 112
Maths Grade 4251 22.8 3.76 18 31
Stats Grade 4247 23.6 3.97 18 31
Grdi¤ 4256 6.85 2.36 1.12 13
Specdi¤ 4256 4.74 1.57 1.18 10.5
N. Entrep.Classes 4256 1.97 0.75 0 6
Entrep.Father 4256 0.19 0.39 0 1
Total N.Jobs 4168 0.88 1.19 0 10
Entrepreneur Age 384 28.9 4.69 23 48
Female 394 0.30 0.46 0 1
Married 394 0.25 0.43 0 1
High Sch.Grade 394 50.5 7.34 36 60
B.A. Grade 394 100.7 7.60 81 112
Maths Grade 394 22.2 3.75 18 31
Stats Grade 394 23.1 3.96 18 30
Grdi¤ 394 7.31 2.33 1.44 13
Specdi¤ 394 4.51 1.40 1.27 10.5
N. Entrep.Classes 394 1.20 0.75 0 6
Entrep.Father 394 0.28 0.45 0 1
Total N.Jobs 387 0.76 1.23 0 10
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Table 2: Entrepreneurial Choice: Cross-sectional Estimates
Model 1: Baseline Lazear Model, Linear
Model 2: Baseline Lazear Model, Logit
Model 3: Baseline Lazear Model, Probit
Model 4: Baseline Lazear Model + Ability & Family Controls, Linear
Model 5: Baseline Lazear Model + Ability & Family Controls, Logit
Model 6: Baseline Lazear Model + Ability & Family Controls, Probit
Model: 1-Linear 2-Logit 3-Probit 4-Linear 5-Logit 6-Probit
N.of obs: 4461 4461 4461 4436 4406 4406
Age 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.007
(0.001) (0.014) (0.007) (0.001) (0.017) (0.009)
[.000] [.000] [.001] [.001]
Female -0.010 -0.135 -0.066 -0.005 -0.069 -0.031
(0.009) (0.117) (0.058) (0.009) (0.122) (0.060)
[-.010] [-.010] [-.005] [-.004]
Grdi¤ 0.006** 0.073** 0.039** 0.003 0.045 0.024
(0.002) (0.024) (0.012) (0.003) (0.033) (0.017)
[.006**] [.006**] [.003] [.003]
Specdi¤ -0.008* -0.106* -0.054* -0.009** -0.123** -0.065**
(0.003) (0.044) (0.022) (0.004) (0.046) (0.023)
[-.008*] [-.008*] [-.010**] [-.010**]
N.Entrep.Classes -0.009 -0.121 -0.063 -0.008 -0.096 -0.048
(0.007) (0.100) (0.048) (0.010) (0.139) (0.066)
[-.009] [-.010] [-.007] [-.007]
Total N.Jobs -0.010* -0.140 -0.068*
(0.005) (0.072) (0.034)
[-.010*] [-.010**]
Married -0.001 -0.008 -0.015
(0.014) (0.197) (0.099)
[-.000] [-.002]
Entrep.Father 0.048** 0.553** 0.278**
(0.013) (0.133) (0.067)
[.047**] [.047**]
B.A.Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
N.Children No No No Yes Yes Yes
Various Grades No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: M arginal FX for logit and prob it in square brackets; S .E . in parentheses w ith p<0.05 = *, p<0.01 = **.
26
Table 3: Can the JAT be Trained? Panel Estimates
Model 1: Reduced Specication, OLS
Model 2: Reduced Specication, Random FX
Model 3: Reduced Specication, Fixed FX
Model 4: Reduced Specication, Amemyia-MaCurdy Panel IV*
Model: 1-OLS 2-Random FX 3- Fixed FX 4- Panel IV*
N.of Obs: 4461 4284 4284 4284
Age 0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Female -0.007 -0.006 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026)
Married -0.002 -0.009 -0.025 -0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Specdi¤ -0.008* -0.009* -0.162
(0.003) (0.004) (0.108)
Grdi¤ 0.001 0.001 -0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.041)
N.Entrep.Classes -0.013 -0.014 0.185
(0.007) (0.008) (0.132)
Total N.Jobs -0.009* -0.011** -0.020** -0.020**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Entrp.Father 0.041** 0.043** -0.097
(0.012) (0.012) (0.248)
B.A.Grade Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Children Yes Yes Yes Yes
Breush-Pagan Test for Unobservables:
Stat.Value: 184.55   
P-Value: 0.000   
Hausman Test for FX Consistency
Stat.Value:  17.97  0.39
P-Value:  0.006  0.99
Note: S .E .in parentheses w ith p<0.05 = *, p<0.01 = **.
*Exogenous Regressors: Age, M arried , N .Children (T im e Varying); N .Entrep .C lasses, Female (T im e F ixed).
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Table 4: ILFI Survey, Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean St.-Dev. Min Max
Worker Age 4188 28.9 8.05 18 60
Out Orig.Family 4171 0.52 0.50 0 1
N.Siblings 4188 2.28 2.01 0 16
Married 4188 0.48 0.49 0 1
N.Children 4188 0.64 0.94 0 7
Female 4188 0.11 0.31 0 1
Italian 4188 0.99 0.10 0 1
N.Years Unempl. 4188 0.90 1.17 0 16
Tot.N.Roles 4188 1.56 0.92 1 8
Av.Job Tenure 4188 3.06 2.23 0 17
Entrep.Father 4031 0.30 0.46 0 1
Entrepreneur Age 985 31.64 8.49 18 60
Out Orig.Family 980 0.58 0.49 0 1
N.Siblings 985 2.27 1.96 0 16
Married 985 0.63 0.48 0 1
N.Children 985 0.86 1.02 0 5
Female 985 0.07 0.25 0 1
Italian 985 0.99 0.09 0 1
N.Years Unempl. 985 0.32 1.13 0 15
Tot.N.Roles 985 1.76 1.08 1 8
Av.Job Tenure 985 3.92 2.56 0 17.5
Entrep.Father 939 0.40 0.49 0 1
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Table 5: Entrepreneurial Choice: Cross-sectional Estimates
Model 1: Baseline Model, Linear
Model 2: Baseline Model, Logit
Model 3: Baseline Model, Probit
Model 4: Baseline Model + Lab. Mkt & Family Controls, Linear
Model 5: Baseline Model + Lab. Mkt & Family Controls, Logit
Model 6: Baseline Model + Lab. Mkt & Family Controls, Probit
Model: 1-Linear 2-Logit 3-Probit 4-Linear 5-Logit 6-Probit
N.of Obs. 5169 5169 5169 4820 4817 4817
Tot.N.Roles 0.027** 0.164** 0.095** 0.025** 0.168** 0.096**
(0.007) (0.042) (0.024) (0.007) (0.050) (0.028)
[.024**] [.025**] [.020**] [.022**]
Av.Job.Tenure 0.022** 0.128** 0.075** 0.020** 0.133** 0.074**
(0.004) (0.022) (0.012) (0.004) (0.026) (0.015)
[.0189**] [.020**] [.016**] [.017**]
Age 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.007
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.005)
[.001] [.001] [.001] [.001]
Female -0.060** -0.467** -0.263** -0.067** -0.536** -0.277**
(0.016) (0.140) (0.075) (0.018) (0.165) (0.090)
[-.061**] [-.063**] [-.054**] [-.056**]
Italian -0.024 -0.213 -0.125 -0.093 -0.675 -0.382
(0.057) (0.379) 0.215) (0.074) (0.441) (0.262)
[-.033] [-.035] [-.099] [-.105]
N.Years Unempl. 0.000 -0.016 -0.005
(0.005) (0.044) (0.023)
[-.002] [-.001]
Entrep.Father 0.059** 0.410** 0.229**
(0.012) (0.088) (0.049)
[.051**] [.055**]
Educational Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Fathers Education No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: M arginal FX for logit and prob it in square brackets; S .E . in parentheses w ith p<0.05 = *, p<0.01 = **.
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Table 6: Can the JAT be Trained? Panel Estimates
Model 1: Baseline Model, Fixed FX
Model 2: Baseline Model, Conditional Logit
Model 3: Baseline Model + Lab. Mkt & Family Controls, Fixed FX
Model 4: Baseline Model + Lab. Mkt & Family Controls, Conditional Logit
Model: 1-Linear 2-C.Logit 3-Linear 4-C.Logit
N.of Obs. 4313 1639 4046 1523
Tot.N.Roles -0.004 -0.229* -0.009 -0.307*
(0.011) (0.103) (0.012) (0.126)
Av.Job Tenure 0.007 0.036 -0.003 -0.106
(0.009) (0.095) (0.009) (0.112)
Age 0.009** 0.104** 0.008** 0.112**
(0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.025)
N.Years Unempl. -0.011 -0.204
(0.012) (0.125)
Family Controls No No Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No No Yes Yes
Breush-Pagan Test for Unobservables:
Stat.Value: 174.75  95.75 
P-Value: 0.000  0.000 
Hausman Test for Random FX Consistency
Stat.Value: 25.13  70.64 
P-Value: 0.000  0.000 
Note: S .E .in parentheses w ith p<0.05 = *, p<0.01 = **.
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